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As the program coordinator of the International Relations program, and as an
instructor of Political Science, I find myself constantly reminding students (and others
in the college community) that we are living in an increasingly international
environment. We need to realize that there are few strictly U.S. corporations, and
that there is no such thing as an American car. Michigan is ranked third out of the
fifty United States in export volume. I tell students, if you are going into business, you
are probably going into international business, like it or not. If you are going into
corporate law, chances are you need to know about private international law. The
U.S. economy and the U.S. political arena can no longer be viewed in isolation from
the rest of the world.
Global events have an important impact on governance within the United States.
It is also true that international relations, and U.S. foreign policy in particular, are
strongly affected by internal U.S. politics and economics. The popular press (and
traditional political science literature as well) doesn't often recognize the importance
of U.S. interest groups and other domestic factors in determining U.S. foreign policy
choices.
U.S. foreign aid is a case in point. My research into the politics of U.S. foreign aid
policy demonstrates that there is a strong relationship between domestic interest
groups and U.S. foreign aid policy.
Public Opinion
Most people resent what they perceive as the use of scarce tax dollars to aid
foreign countries. When asked to identify budget cuts which could be made to reduce
the U.S. budget deficit, most Americans say that the number one item is foreign aid.
Their perception is that aid programs are wasteful and inefficient, and that aid funds
probably just end up in the hands of corrupt elites in recipient countries. Anti-aid
forces in the U.S. also usually argue that we should focus on U.S. needs first, that
charity begins at home.
In typical melodramatic fashion, Pat Buchanan, in 1990, argued as follows:

We cannot permit endless transfusions of the lifeblood of American capitalism
into the mendicant countries and economic corpses of socialism, without
bleeding ourselves to death. Foreign aid is an idea whose time has passed.1
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He also lashed out at the U.S. "internationalist set," which is, "never at a loss for new
ideas to divert U.S. wealth and power into crusades and causes having little or
nothing to do with the true national interest of the United States." 2

Aid is in the National Interest
In the face of Buchanan's type of misleading rhetoric, we need to be clear about
the true nature of foreign aid. U.S. aid, as it stands, is in the U.S. national interest.
The drive to cut "do-gooder" programs from the budget is really just a lot of posturing
and half-truths. What most Americans don't understand is that there are strong
political and economic forces which support U.S. foreign aid spending, and they are
not the "bleeding heart liberals." For example, very few people know that nearly 70%
of the aid budget is spent in the United States, on U.S. goods and services and U.S.
administration costs. 3 This means that about ten of the approximately fourteen billion
dollars spent on aid last year was spent on domestically produced goods and
services.
What are the domestic gains from foreign aid? What interests in the U.S. support
aid programs and why? In a 1991 report entitled Development in the National
Interest, the U.S. Agency for International Development (the U.S. government
agency which oversees foreign aid programs) cited several categories of domestic
beneficiaries from U.S. aid programs. For now, I will focus on the domestic
beneficiaries of economic or "humanitarian" aid alone.
Procurement of Aid Goods in the U.S.
First, there is direct economic compensation for U.S. economic assistance
abroad. Many firms and consulting agencies provide aid goods and services under
contract with the Agency for International Develoment. Government contracts to
procure food aid, vehicles, and equipment are one way in which aid funds are kept in
the U.S. In addition, U.S. shipping firms transport aid goods and services overseas.
Aid legislation requires that the great majority of goods and services provided by aid
be American. It is worth noting that aid workers must fly on U.S. carriers, and aid
goods must be transported on U.S. flagships. In addition, many private consulting
firms and public universities are awarded multi-million-dollar contracts to implement
aid projects overseas.
Aid as Market Development
Second, there are U.S. firms which benefit from aid used as a "market
development" tool. It is important to recognize that many countries which were once
recipients of U.S. aid have gone on to become major trade partners for the U.S. in
these aid goods. Part of the motivation behind the Marshall Plan was to rebuild
Europe at the end of World War II in order to have markets for U.S. goods.
More recently, Korea and Taiwan have become major importers of U.S. goods,
having gone from receiving U.S. food aid twenty-five years ago to being major
importers of U.S. goods today. USAID estimates that almost all of the top fifty
countries that today consume U.S. agricultural products were once foreign aid
recipients. This "graduation" from an aid dependency to a trade partnership occurs
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as an aid recipient country builds its economy. It also occurs as food aid recipients
acquire a taste for U.S. products. Traditional rice-eating states such as Taiwan and
Korea, which were introduced to wheat as food aid in the 1960s and 1970s, today
import large quantities of U.S. wheat on the open market.
U.S. foreign aid also benefits U.S. investors overseas by solidifying and securing
foreign markets. A secure diplomatic and aid relationship will reduce the risk for
private U.S. investors overseas. In my statistical analysis of the relationship between
trade and aid, I find that there is a significant relationship between U.S. aid to a
recipient country and U.S. trade and foreign investment in that country. There is a
direct, positive relationship between trade and investment flows and U.S. aid flows to
less developed countries.
Part of my research also includes analysis of archives from presidential libraries.
There is a wealth of documents which reveal the important relationship between U.S.
interest groups and aid policy-making. For instance, in a memo to President Ford in
1975, Secretary of State Kissinger argued for continued aid to Zaire, based on the
fact that the U.S. had billions of dollars of foreign investment in Zaire and that it was
"our second largest market in black Africa" (after Nigeria). 4 Developing and securing
markets for U.S. goods and investments is another priority for U.S. foreign economic
assistance.
Food Aid and Farm Interests
Finally, I want to emphasize the absolutely vital role that farm interests play in
determining which commodities are included in the aid program and where they are
sent. It is worth noting at the outset that only commodities already included under the
U.S. farm support program are eligible to be sent as U.S. food aid. It is also worth
noting that until the mid-1980s, tobacco and cotton were thus included in the U.S.
"food" aid program. These are clearly examples of "foreign aid in the U.S. national
interest."
In fact, throughout the history of the food aid program, there has been a
consistent and significant relationship between the volume of food aid and the
market conditions for food aid commodities. For example, large quantities of stocks
of food aid commodities are associated with high volumes of food aid in the year
immediately following. Commercial exports are also significantly tied to food aid
volume, such that food aid is essentially used to bolster demand for the goods when
commercial markets are weak.
Food aid in rice provides an important case in point. In 1974-1975, surplus
production of rice in the U.S. caused rice producers and marketers to pressure the
government for additional shipments of rice as U.S. food aid under the PL-480 or
"food for peace" program. Rice interests hoped that increased shipments of rice
overseas would reduce the oversupply and thus avert a sharp reduction in price. The
interagency committee on food aid was already well aware of the rice surpluses.
Reporting on their December 10, 1974 meeting, Ed Schuh noted:

Grand Valley Review • 54

Agriculture is quite anxious to move both milk and rice and views these
commodities as essentially throw-aways. Neither State nor NSC particularly
want either, and in the case of rice there appears to be serious questions as to
whether up to 1 million tons can be moved by the end of the fiscal year. To
move rice requires a sizable Korea program, since they are about the only
ones who want it. [italics mine]
Indeed, Korea received $140 million of food aid through Title I in the following
fiscal year. The State Department acted quickly to search out new aid partners, and
U.S. embassy employees in Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, and Syria busied
themselves in negotiating new PL-480 concessional sales agreements. Not only are
we giving rice aid to support our farmers, but we are letting the excess rice influence
decisions about where the aid goes.
In more recent years, there has been a strong relationship between market forces
and aid in soybean products. The introduction of tropical oils into the U.S. market has
hurt the position of U.S. soybean producers and their ability to sell soybean oil
abroad. During this time, soybeans and soybean oil have become a much larger
proportion of US food aid shipped overseas. Therefore, we can argue that food aid is
just another element of the U.S. farm support program, and that the humanitarian
objectives of aid are questionable at best.
The Humanitarian Impulse
Clearly there is a relationship between U.S. farm interests and U.S. foreign aid
policy. What are the implications of this relationship for the humanitarian objectives of
aid? The humanitarian objectives of aid have never been central to the program, and
despite political rhetoric to the contrary, humanitarian considerations are still not a
terribly important part of aid decision-making. The whole of Africa receives only
about 12% of the total U.S. aid budget, while Egypt and Israel together receive 35%
percent. My statistical work also reveals that developing-country food production is
not significantly related to U.S. food aid flows. And the choice of recipient countries is
a function of three interlinked factors: U.S. security interests, U.S. economic
interests, and absolute need in recipient countries.
Conclusion
The domestic politics of U.S. foreign aid is obviously much more complicated than
I have been able to present in such a brief essay. I have focused only on the profitmaking institutions which gain from U.S. aid abroad. To fully explain the domestic
politics of U.S. aid policy, one would also have to include the impact of non-profit
groups and ethnic interest groups, such as the Jewish-American lobby or the GreekAmerican lobby.
Nonetheless, we must recognize just how important U.S. interests are in
determining U.S. foreign policy. Aid policy is very pragmatic and profitable for certain
U.S. interest groups. It is not, as Pat Buchanan suggests, an "endless transfusion of
55 • Grand Valley Review

the lifeblood 1
not "bleeding
In Februa
reporter note1
U.S. foreign
Foreign Oper.
foreign aid,"
economic intE
U.S. economi
quite simple t1
1Patrick J. Bucha
Opposing Viewpoi

2 Ibid.
3 u.s. Agency for 1
4 Memo from Seen

these
>articularly
tions as to
I year. To
•t the only

!WS

the following
partners, and
Syria busied
Not only are
rice influence

narket forces
). market has
soybean oil
much larger
1at food aid is
humanitarian

the lifeblood of American capitalism into the mendicant countries," and giving aid is
not "bleeding ourselves to death."
In February 1995, the Grand Rapids Press ran a story about foreign aid. The
reporter noted that the new Republican Congress in Washington will be scrutinizing
U.S. foreign aid. Kentucky Republican Mitch McConnell, Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Operations Subcommittee, proposed "A sweeping congressional overhaul of
foreign aid," in order to "set priorities tied more tightly to American security and
economic interests." Given the already strong links between U.S. foreign aid and
U.S. economic interests, this part of the Republican contract with America should be
quite simple to accomplish.
1
Patrick J. Buchanan. 1991. "The U.S. Should Reduce Its Role in World Affairs," in The New World Order:
Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 77.
2 Ibid.
3u.S. Agency for International Development. 1991. Development in the National Interest.
4
Memo from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, July 1976.
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